God, Religion and meaning in life

Thaddeus Metz
 
Research Professor of Philosophy
University of Johannesburg
 
1.         Question: Is the traditional religious account of meaning in life correct, that is, in order for our lives to be meaningful, must we play an appropriate role in God's plan? Would our lives necessarily be meaningless, if God did not exist or if we failed to fulfil a purpose that he has for us?
 
2.         Definitions.
 
2.1.      ‘God’: a spiritual person that is all-knowing, all-good and all-powerful and that is the ground of the physical universe.
 
2.2.      ‘Meaning in life’: ends that are most worth pursuing besides one's own happiness and that are usually worthy of great esteem or admiration once achieved. 
 
3.         The Purpose View: Meaning in life can come only from fulfilling God's purpose for us. If a perfect, spiritual being that is the ground of the physical universe did not exist, if he lacked a purpose for us, or if we failed to fulfil it (willingly), then our lives would lack anything worthy of great esteem or admiration.
 
4.         My Claim: The Purpose View is false, or at least dubious in a way not often recognized by friends of religion. For one, if meaning in life could come from God alone, there is reason to think that it would not do so in virtue of fulfilling his purpose for us. For another, it is unlikely that meaning in life could come from God alone; in particular, certain religious practices could be sources of meaning in life, even if God did not exist.
 
5.         Five Arguments for the Purpose View. Why God's purpose, and why God's purpose? 
 
5.1.      Contingency. If God did not exist, then our existence would be a mere accident, something random. To have meaning, though, requires existing for a reason, something that could be imparted only by having been created for a purpose by an agent.[i]
 
Objection 1: It does not follow that we must have been created by God in particular. 
 
Objection 2: Either (a) it was up to God whether to create us, or (b) it was not. If (a), then it was God’s arbitrary decision, and we ‘got lucky’. If (b), then God had to create us, not unlike the way a deterministic world without God would have had to result in us.
 
5.2.      Aesthetic Value. If we and the universe had not been created by God for a reason, then our lives would not have the value that a piece of music does, as something that has been intentionally fashioned to express something.[ii]
 
Objection: This rationale does not underwrite the Purpose Theory, as our lives are always already meaningful, regardless of what we choose to do.
 
5.3.      Scope. Perhaps only by fulfilling God's purpose could our lives have a great impact on the universe. If God did not exist, or if we failed to help fulfil his plan for the universe, then the influence of our lives would be miniscule, utterly isolated and hence meaningless.[iii]
 
Objection 1: Even if we played a role in God's plan, any one of our roles would be small.
 
Objection 2: If human beings had greater technological capabilities, e.g., to move about the universe at great speeds, then we would not need God in order to be part of a plan with a very large scope.
 
5.4.      Afterlife. Perhaps only by fulfilling God's purpose could we obtain deserved reward (justice) or the gift of Heaven (grace). If God did not exist, or if we failed to fulfil a purpose that he has for us, then there could be no worthwhile, eternal afterlife and hence our life on earth would be meaningless.[iv]
 
Objection 1: An impersonal, Karmic force could apportion benefits to us in another world.
 
Objection 2: Even if a personal being were necessary in order to apportion benefits to us in another world, it need not be a perfect, spiritual being. A physical being with lots of knowledge and power (short of omniscience and omnipotence) could do the job.
 
5.5.      Source of Right and Wrong. Perhaps only by fulfilling God's purpose could we lead a moral life. If God did not exist, or if we failed to fulfil a purpose that he has for us, then we could not live up to universal standards of what is right and wrong and hence life would be meaningless.[v] 
 
Objection 1: God Can’t Ground Rules with an Intuitive Moral Content. The ‘Euthyphro’ dilemma. Either (a) God intends us to do something because it is right, or (b) something is right for us to do because God intends it. If (a), then God is not the source of moral rules (he knows them, but doesn't create them), and, in principle, one's life could be meaningful by following the purposes of anyone who knows what the moral rules are. If (b), then moral rules would be arbitrary in a way that they seem not to be, e.g., if God intended us to torture babies for fun, then it would be right.
 
Objection 2: God Can’t Ground Invariant Moral Rules. God’s mind could change, and on many views, it has changed, meaning that the moral ends he lays down could change and have changed, too. EG: Circumcision no longer required; retribution no longer permitted.
 
Objection 3: God Can’t Ground Moral Rules with Normativity. The bare fact that an agent, even the strongest and most informed one, commands us to do something is not in itself good reason to do it. The fact that one ought to do something is not grounded in the bare fact of having been told to do it.
 
Reply to All Three Objections: God’s Nature Essentially Includes the Virtue of Love. No torturing babies able to be commanded, as that would be unloving; no change of mind possible, as God’s essence is loving (instead, God merely minds change); normativity is possible via commands because of value of love from which they spring.
 
Objection: But, then, love appears to be the ground of morality, not God. Why think it must be God as a loving being, and not the property of love as such, that constitutes the moral rules?
 
 
6.         Argument 1 against the Purpose View: God's Ability to Ground Meaning. Basic idea of the argument: since we also have purposes, it is unlikely to be God's purposiveness that would make him the sole source of meaning in life.[vi]
 
6.1.      The Objection.
 
6.1.1.   The more reason there is to think that meaning in life must ultimately be a function of our relationship to God (and not to one another absent God), the more reason there is to think that God must be different from and higher than us.
6.1.2.   God would be most different from and higher than us if he had superlatively valuable properties that we could not conceivably exhibit, such as beingatemporal (beyond time), immutable (unchangeable), or simple (lacking parts).
6.1.3.   A being that is atemporal, immutable and simple could not be an agent with a purpose.
6.1.4    Therefore, the more reason there is to think that meaning in life must ultimately be a function of our relationship to God (and not to one another absent God), the more reason there is to think that God would not be an agent with a purpose.
 
6.2.      Implication of the Objection. If this argument were sound, then meaning would have to come from God in some way other than by us fulfilling his purpose, perhaps by joining God in an afterlife that is beyond time (cf Aquinas) or by imitating God in this life (as per some Eastern traditions). 
 
7.         Argument 2 against the Purpose View: Discrepancy in Justification. Basic idea: most of us implicitly believe that meaning in life is not a function of God alone, since we know that some lives are meaningful and since we don't know that God exists (even if we have faith that he does).[vii]
 
7.1.      The Objection.
 
7.1.1.   We are very confident (there is a lot of evidence) that the lives of Mandela, Mother Teresa, Picasso and Einstein were meaningful.
7.1.2.   We are not very confident (there is not a lot of evidence) that a purposive God exists.
7.1.3.   Therefore, it is unlikely that God must exist with a purpose for us in order for people's lives to be meaningful.
 
7.2.      Implication of the Objection. If this argument were sound, then it would be likely that particular activities in a purely physical world could make one's life meaningful, roughly, by engaging with the good (helping others, love), the true (intellectual enquiry) and the beautiful (art, creativity).
             
7.3.      How Religion Could Provide Meaning without God.
 
7.3.1.   The good: having a community (sharing a culture, feeling a sense of togetherness, and acting for one another's sake), engaging in charity work, becoming a better person.
            7.3.2.   The true: reflecting on the nature of reality and of value.
            7.3.3.   The beautiful: producing and listening to music; enjoying visual artwork. 
 
 
8.         Conclusion. I have questioned arguments for the Purpose View, the traditional religious account of meaning in life, and also argued against the Purpose View itself. I have also suggested two ways it is worth reconceptualising the ways in which religious practice could confer meaning on life. Specifically, I have suggested alternative ways of relating to God that might provide a spiritual source of meaning, and I have also indicated respects in which church activities could confer meaning on life apart from fostering a certain relationship with God. Holiness in this world is available and seems to be what makes our lives meaningful, regardless of whether a holy being in another world exists.
 
Notes


10.0pt;">[i] William Lane Craig ‘The Absurdity of Life Without God’, reproduced online at: http://www.bethinking.org/pdf.php?ID=129.          
 
[ii] Jeffrey Gordon, ‘Is the Existence of God Relevant to the Meaning of Life?’, The Modern Schoolman 60 (1983): 227-46.
 
[iii] Cf Charles Hartshorne, ‘God and the Meaning of Life’, in Leroy Rouner, ed., Boston University Studies in Philosophy and Religion, Volume 6: On Nature (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), pp. 154-68.
 
[iv] William Davis, ‘The Meaning of Life’, Metaphilosophy 18 (1987): 288-305.
 
[v] E.g., Craig, note 1; and John Cottingham, ‘Religion and Value’, from his The Spiritual Dimension: Religion, Philosophy and Human Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 37-57.
 
[vi] Thaddeus Metz, ‘Could God's Purpose Be the Source of Life's Meaning?’, Religious Studies 36 (2000): 293-313, and ‘God's Purpose as Irrelevant to Life's Meaning: Reply to Affolter’, Religious Studies 43 (2007): 457-64.
 
[vii] Thaddeus Metz, ‘Recent Work on the Meaning of Life’, Ethics 112 (2002): 784-85, 809, and ‘God, Morality and the Meaning of Life’, in Nafsika Athanassoulis and Samantha Vice, eds., The Moral Life (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 201-27.
    
tmetz@uj.ac.za